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Abstract
It is well documented that people with moderate-to-severe traumatic brain injury (TBI) can undergo personality changes,
including becoming more impulsive in terms of how they behave. Legal guidance and academic commentary support the view
that impulsiveness can render someone decisionally incompetent as defined by English and Welsh law. However, impulsiveness
is a trait found within the healthy population. Arguably, impulsiveness is also a trait that gives rise to behaviours that should
normally be tolerated evenwhen they cause harm to the person enacting the behaviours. The purpose of this paper is to showwhy
both of these considerations present as significant challenges to the law in England and Wales.
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Introduction
A key legal and ethical tenet of a liberal society has it that
people be allowed to make decisions regarding significant
areas of their lives for themselves, such as whether to undergo
a healthcare procedure or to make a financial transaction.
Nevertheless, many jurisdictions have law that describes cir-
cumstances in which people are to be deemed incapable of
making decisions, and where decisions are to be made on their
behalf by a surrogate decision-maker. The capability to make
decisions for oneself (andwhich is referred to by such terms as
‘mental capacity’, ‘decision-making capacity’ and ‘compe-
tence’; these and cognate terms are used interchangeably in
what follows) is usually taken to comprise certain decisional
abilities, including those involved in understanding, memory,
and deliberation.
It is important to note that the abilities in question reflect
lawmakers’ attempts to set the bar for capacity at an appropri-
ate level. For lawmakers (parliament, the courts), the question
of whether a person is competent is not that of whether a
person has decisional abilities that would satisfy a decisional
ideal. Rather, it is that of whether regarding a person as com-
petent is likely to achieve the right balance between various
and often competing goods (those pertaining to respecting
people’s sovereignty rights and those pertaining to protecting
vulnerable people from coming to harm, for instance). For this
reason, the law has sought to avoid adopting an idealized
model of capacity, such as one requiring people to be able to
make ‘rational’ decisions (Culver and Gert 1990, 2004), on
the grounds that such a model would be too demanding and
would likely entail that few people have capacity.
Yet we should always remain open to the possibility that
the law has got it wrong, that reasons might exist for thinking
that despite lawmakers’ best efforts, the bar for capacity has
been set too high or low. One way to evaluate whether the law
has set the bar at the right level is by considering groups of
people who would qualify as decisionally incompetent ac-
cording to existing law, and to ask whether these people ought
to be considered incompetent by law. For instance, we might
ask whether regarding such people as decisionally incompe-
tent constitutes a wrongful violation of these people’s sover-
eignty rights, their rights to make decisions in a way that
accords with their own preferences, desires and values.
Now, it is well documented that people with moderate-to-
severe traumatic brain injury (TBI) can undergo personality
changes, including becoming more impulsive (see, for
instance, Crowe 2008, McAllister 2008, Rao et al. 2009,
Rochat et al. 2013).1 Note we are speaking of what we might
1 TBI can be mild, moderate or severe (depending on the extent of damage to
the brain and severity of symptoms after injury). Although mild TBI can lead
to behavioural and mood changes, personality change concomitant to brain
injury is more often associated with moderate-to-severe TBI, and so, it is the
more severe forms of TBI with which this paper is principally concerned.
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think of as changes in personality traits, that is to say, changes
in characteristic patterns of thoughts, feelings and behaviours,
and which in cases of moderate-to-severe TBI can include
being at increased risk of behaving in impulsive ways. Legal
guidance and academic commentary support the view that
impulsiveness can render someone incompetent as defined
by English and Welsh law. However, impulsiveness is a trait
found within the healthy population and not only in those who
suffer psychological injury. Arguably, impulsiveness is also a
trait that gives rise to behaviours that normally should be
tolerated even when they result in poor outcomes for the per-
son enacting the behaviours. The purpose of this paper is to
show why both these considerations present as significant
challenges to the law in England and Wales.
The next section says something more about what
decision-making capacity is and what role a determination
of capacity or incapacity serves in law. The section fol-
lowing explains how moderate-to-severe TBI with person-
ality change can rob people of their capacity to make
important decisions for themselves. The penultimate sec-
tion advances two challenges that cases of TBI with per-
sonality change present for the law and especially for the
criteria for capacity as spelled out by the law. Finally, the
concluding section outlines a number of additional con-
siderations that are pertinent to answering the question of
whether the law ought to change in light of the challenges
raised in the paper.
Decision-Making Capacity
The relevant consideration regarding whether someone has
decisional capacity is that of whether the person satisfies legal
criteria for capacity. In the context of England and Wales
(though not Scotland and Northern Ireland, which are
governed by separate law), this is a matter of whether a person
has a number of abilities as outlined by the Mental Capacity
Act 2005 (MCA). These are the abilities to understand infor-
mation relevant to the decision, to retain the information, to
use or weigh the information as part of the process of making
the decision and to communicate the decision (orally or by
other means).2
A number of observations might be made. First, mental
capacity law uses a functional or process test for capacity
and not one that is based on decision outcomes. The reasoning
for this relates to one of the underlying principles of mental
capacity law, namely that people have the right to make deci-
sions that others might consider unwise, irresponsible or im-
prudent. The worry is that a test based on outcome—on
whether what a patient decides to do is desirable or not as
evaluated by a mental capacity assessor, for instance—
would interfere with the right that the law is largely designed
to protect.
Second, mental capacity is task specific, which means that
capacity is to be assessed for each decision a patient might
make. It follows that a patient might be competent regarding
one kind of decision, say, a simple decision regarding treat-
ment or a financial transaction, but incompetent regarding
other kinds of decisions. On the face of it, we might consider
the difficulty of decision to reflect what is at stake, the idea
being that the riskier the decision, the more difficult the deci-
sion is to make. However, although a higher risk decision
might be more difficult to make, it is unclear this need always
be the case.
Third, note that according to mental capacity law, decision-
al capacity is all or nothing. A person either does or does not
have capacity; there is no such thing as degrees of capacity.
This is because the legal notion of capacity serves as a thresh-
old concept that functions to distinguish between those who
should retain decisional authority and those who should not
(see, Buchanan and Brock 1989: 26–29).
The third point serves to remind us what is at stake
when assessing whether someone has decision-making ca-
pacity, namely that of whether someone should be permit-
ted to exert substantial autonomy over what happens to
them. The point deserves emphasizing because as Paul
Appelbaum puts it, ‘there is no more profound infringe-
ment of the rights of citizens than the determination that
they are incompetent’ (Appelbaum 1998: 374). For this
reason, it is critical that decisional capacity assessors are
confident beyond all reasonable doubt that the person
whose decisional capacity they are assessing really does
lack the relevant decisional abilities before finding that
person to lack capacity.
It is imperative also that lawmakers set the bar for
capacity at the right level. Set the bar too high and people
whose decisional capacity should not be in doubt will be
at risk of having their decisional authority removed from
them. Set the bar too low and people whose decisional
capacity should be in doubt will be at risk of causing
harm to themselves. Again, the functional test for
capacity—comprising key decisional abilities—is the
product of lawmakers’ attempt to set the bar at the appro-
priate level, one that succeeds in protecting vulnerable
adults from causing themselves harm, while at the same
time ensuring that most people can make decisions re-
garding significant aspects of their lives for themselves.
2 Although the focus of this paper is on English and Welsh law and its Mental
Capacity Act, it is worth remarking that the arguments advanced are likely to
be relevant to the law of a number of other liberal jurisdictions, including the
USA, which conceptualize decisional capacity in a similar way, namely to
comprise abilities such as understanding and appreciation, retention of infor-
mation and deliberation of risks and benefits (Buchanan 2004, Grisso and
Appelbaum 1998). Indeed, as Owen et al point out, the ‘MCA standard can
itself been seen as a close variant on the standard of competence for treatment
decisions distilled by Grisso and Appelbaum (1998) on the basis of a system-
atic study of case law in the United States’ (2018a:2)
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Decision-Making Capacity and Personality
Change Concomitant with TBI
It has long been known that a moderate-to-severe TBI can
alter someone’s personality, those largely non-cognitive qual-
ities or traits (including a person’s values, emotions, prefer-
ences, and desires) that make-up a person’s character or what a
person is like. Probably the best-known case of personality
change caused by TBI is that of Phineas Gage (1823-1860),
who suffered extensive frontal lobe damage when an iron rod
penetrated his skull while working on a railroad in the US
during the 1840s. John Harlow, Gage’s doctor at the time,
describes vividly the changes that occurred to Gage’s
personality:
Gage was fitful, irreverent, indulging at times in the
grossest profanity (which was not previously his cus-
tom), manifesting but little deference for his fellows,
impatient of restraint or advice when it conflicts with
his desires, at times pertinaciously obstinate, yet capri-
cious and vacillating, devising many plans of future op-
erations, which are no sooner arranged than they are
abandoned in turn for others appearing more feasible.
A child in his intellectual capacity and manifestations,
he has the animal passions of a strong man. Previous to
his injury, although untrained in the schools, he pos-
sessed a well-balanced mind, and was looked upon by
those who knew him as a shrewd, smart businessman,
very energetic and persistent in executing all his plans of
operation. In this regard his mindwas radically changed,
so decidedly that his friends… said he was ‘no longer
Gage’.
(Harlow 1868)
Personality changes concomitant with a moderate-to-
severe TBI need not always be as violent or damaging as those
undergone by Gage. Indeed, TBI can sometimes lead to pos-
itive changes in personality (King et al. 2017). Nevertheless, a
moderate-to-severe brain injury can often lead to a person
acquiring negative or challenging personality traits (see, for
example, Crowe 2008). For instance, people with a moderate-
to-severe TBI can be irritable and aggressive (Rao et al. 2009).
They might also be more impulsive and less inhibited
(McAllister, 2008, Rochat et al. 2013).3 As a result, such peo-
ple may bemore inclined to engage in behaviours that threaten
to cause them harm, such as gambling, heavy drinking, spend-
ing money on expensive or inessential items and having sex-
ual relations with people they do not know. And it is these
potentially negative effects of personality change on peoples’
decision-making that makes this group of people of particular
concern to those whose role it is to assess whether capacity is
present.
So, does personality change concomitant with moderate-
to-severe TBI deprive people of decisional capacity? The an-
swer insofar as legal capacity is concerned depends on wheth-
er a person retains those decisional abilities constitutive of
capacity. Now, there is no suggestion that a personality change
need impair a person’s ability to understand and retain infor-
mation relevant to the decision at hand. One might support
that people with personality change are unlikely to understand
the social or emotional consequences of certain decisions. But
putting aside the question of whether people with moderate-
to-severe TBI fail to have such an understanding, legal
judgment in England and Wales has found against the use of
a ‘social-consequences’ test.4
If there is a failure of capacity, then it is the ability to
deliberate or use and weigh information that is likely to be
relevant. Now, on the face of it, we might think that per-
sonality change concomitant with brain injury does not
impair the ability in question. To be sure, a personality
change might lead to a difference in how information is
used or weighed. For instance, someone who is no longer
averse to the risks attached to spending money on expen-
sive goods is likely to weigh information pertaining to
such risks differently than prior to undergoing a personal-
ity change. But that does not mean the person is deprived
of the ability to use and weigh information relevant to the
making of financial decisions.
It is curious, then, that mental capacity guidance and
academic commentary suggests that personality change
concomitant with a moderate-to-severe TBI can result in
an impairment to the ability to reason or deliberate. In
particular, impulsivity is a personality trait sometimes ac-
quired by people with moderate-to-severe TBI that has
been associated with the loss of an ability to use or weigh
information relevant to the making of a decision. Thus,
with regard to mental capacity guidance, subsection s4.22
of the MCA Code of Practice states:
3 See also the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th
edition (DSM-5) (n.d), which considers personality change (including, disin-
hibition, apathy, suspiciousness and aggression) as a common symptom
supporting a diagnosis of major or mild neurocognitive disorder due to trau-
matic brain injury. See as well the International Statistical Classification of
Diseases and Related Health Problems, 10th edition (ICD-10) (n.d), which
considers impulsivity and associated changes in behaviour as a common
symptom of organic personality disorder and which can be caused by TBI.
4 See Mr Justice Bodey’s judgement in the case of A Local Authority v A
[2010] when considering whether the ability to understand information rele-
vant to making a decision should include understanding the emotional and
social consequences of refusing contraception—what Bodey J referred to as
a ‘social-consequences test’. Bodey J writes at para [61]: ‘I am persuaded that
this wider test would create a real risk of blurring the line between capacity and
best interests. If part of the test were to involve whether the woman concerned
understood enough about the practical realities of parenthood, then one would
inevitably be in the realms of a degree of subjectivity, into which a paternalistic
approach could easily creep.’
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Some people who have serious brain damage might
make impulsive decisions regardless of information
they have been given or their understanding of it.
Unhelpfully, the MCA Code of Practice does not explain
whymaking impulsive decisions regardless of information the
person has been given or their understanding of it can indicate
a failure to be able to use and weigh information. For a clearer
and more comprehensive explanation of how personality
change might impair capacity, we need to turn to the academic
commentary.
In a number of recent works, Gareth Owen and colleagues
explore what might be amiss in cases of brain-injured people
who are susceptible to making impulsive decisions (Owen
et al. 2015, Owen et al. 2018a). From their observations of
patients with acquired brain injury, the authors identify three
abilities that they take to be involved in being able to use and
weigh information relevant to the decision at hand. The first is
the ‘ability to have ‘real-time, online’ awareness of deficits
and impairments’ (2018a:15). Owen and colleagues found
that although patients may be retrospectively or concurrently
aware of the existence of certain deficits, patients were often
unable to use that awareness to inform their ‘navigation of the
decision situation’. For example, one patient expressed aware-
ness of having difficulties in controlling their temper at the
very same time they were losing their temper with another
patient, thereby evidencing an inability to use their awareness
to moderate their behaviour (Owen et al. 2018a:13).
The second ability is that of being able ‘to detach and
engage with impulses and behavioral cues afforded by the
decision situation’ (2018a:15). What the authors mean by this
is that certain environmental cues automatically trigger certain
behaviours in the person without that person first engaging in
a process of deliberation or evaluation. For instance, a person
might act on an impulse to spend money or drink heavily
without stopping to deliberate regarding the suitability of that
response.
The third ability the authors identify is the ‘ability to pre-
figure a decision situation by being attuned to relevant norma-
tive features’ (2018a:16). Drawing on the neuroscience liter-
ature (e.g. Bechara et al. 1994, Bechara et al. 1999, Damasio
1994) and their own qualitative data, the authors give reason
for thinking that patients with brain injury lack certain emo-
tions (‘somatic markers’) that help to guide people in their
decision-making by way of serving to provide people with
an awareness of relevant norms of behaviour.
We might distinguish, then, between two groups of people
with moderate-to-severe TBI whose personality change influ-
ences their decision-making. On the one hand, we find that
group comprising people who retain the ability to weigh or use
information, albeit in a way that differs from how they would
use or weigh the information were they not suffering a
moderate-to-severe TBI. On the other hand, we find that group
comprising people who have acquired an impulsive trait and
who as a result may be unable to deliberate or use information.
Acknowledge that the existence of the two groups pose deci-
sional capacity assessors with a significant and unique chal-
lenge, insofar as assessors need to exercise care when
assessing which of the two groups someone with a TBI be-
longs. The challenge is particularly acute, since members of
both groups might engage in decision-making with similar
outcomes, including outcomes that are harmful to the person
in question. However, whereas the law permits the removal of
decisional authority from members of the first group, the law
does not permit the removal of decisional authority from
members of the second group. Capacity assessors need to be
diligent when assessing capacity, then, and not be led into
thinking that someone whose personality has changed must
be decisionally incapable solely because that person is now
more inclined to make unwise or bad decisions.5
Challenges to the Law
In what follows, two challenges that cases of TBI with per-
sonality change present for the law are spelt-out. The first
challenge questions whether the law provides decisional ca-
pacity assessors a principled way of distinguishing between
impulsive people with moderate-to-severe TBI and impulsive
people in the healthy population that would justify finding
only the former as being incompetent. The second challenge
questions whether by requiring people to be able to deliberate
or weigh and use information, the law wrongly violates the
sovereignty rights of people who are impulsive or spontane-
ous by nature.
5 The risk of proper care or diligence not being exercised by capacity assessors
is illustrated nicely by the case of V v R [2011]. One of the claimant’s doctors,
whose testimony was used by the judge when finding the claimant to lack
capacity with respect to the making of certain financial decisions, stated:
[D]uring my interview with [V] I noted that she was unable to weigh up the
consequences of her actions taking into account relevant information, even
though she understood the issues involved. For example, she said that she
would take the offer of a sum of money won in a competition because she
wanted it straight away. She would not consider whether she actually needed
the money at the time or the virtue of delaying receipt in return for an extreme-
ly favourable large sum. In my opinion, this response to formal questions in a
consulting room corresponds to the impulsive and irresponsible behaviour
which she shows and acknowledges in the real world...
Now, there is no implication the claimant was competent with respect to the
making of financial decisions. However, by describing the claimant’s behav-
iour as ‘irresponsible’ the doctor was drawing on a consideration that we might
think is immaterial as far as a finding of incapacity is concerned. For, again, the
relevant issue insofar as the law is concerned is not that of whether a person
engages in irresponsible behaviour but that of whether a person has the ability
to use and weigh information relevant to the making of a decision. The latter
issue is an empirical matter regarding the possession of an ability required by
law for mental capacity, whereas the former issue pertains to the making of a
value judgment (namely, that of whether a person has behaved responsibly or
not), and is a matter that the law views as irrelevant for the purpose of assessing
capacity.
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The Overlap Challenge
Impulsivity is a trait found in the healthy population and not
only in those who have suffered a TBI. This gives rise to the
worry that if impulsivity can render a person incompetent,
then capacity law may entail that many people in the healthy
population are incompetent. Call this the overlap challenge.
The overlap challenge is a version of what Owen and col-
leagues call the overlap problem (Owen et al. 2018a).
However, whereas Owen and colleagues construe the overlap
problem as a challenge formental capacity assessors, namely,
that of how assessors are to distinguish between impulsivity in
cases of TBI and impulsivity as found in the healthy popula-
tion, the overlap challenge is being construed here as a chal-
lenge to the law itself.
There are two ways we might try to answer the overlap
challenge, both of which seek to show that the law does not
entail that impulsive people in the healthy population are in-
competent. Neither way is without its difficulties. First, we
could argue that only in the TBI case do we find a loss or
impairment of ability to deliberate or use and weigh informa-
tion. Here, the basic idea is that impulsive people within the
healthy population could act less impulsively should they de-
cide, whereas those with a moderate-to-severe TBI lack the
ability to behave in a way that would qualify as using and
weighing information relevant to the decision at hand. Owen
and colleagues appear to advance such an idea when they
write:
The crucial point is that, for some patients,
that impulsive behavior is born of underlying inabilities
that themselves render decision making impossible, at
least for certain classes of decision. Impulsivity of this
sort differs…in kind from the impulsivity of an individ-
ual who has the relevant abilities but in particular in-
stances chooses not to exercise them.
Owen et al. (2018a:17)
But do impulsive people within the healthy population pos-
sess abilities involved in the making of more measured deci-
sions? To be sure, there are likely to be some people who act
impulsively on occasion and whomight have behaved inmore
measured ways if they chose. However, on the face of it, many
impulsive people have little ability to deliberate regarding the
decisions they make, at least at the time of making those
decisions. Impulsive buyers, for instance, very often seem to
be people who are carried away with desires or impulses to
spend money on certain goods, and who at the time of making
those decisions have little ability to step back and deliberate
on the wisdom of what they are about to do. This is why we
tend to think of impulsiveness as a personality trait that shapes
or defines a person and by so doing sets parameters to the
decisions a person is able to make. At the very least, the claim
that many impulsive people within the healthy population
have decisional abilities that those with moderate-to-severe
TBI lack would need to be empirically shown and not just
assumed to be true.
The second way we might try to distinguish between
people whose impulsivity is caused by TBI and people
whose impulsivity is not caused by TBI draws on the fact
that the impairment of the ability to deliberate is likely
only to be a necessary condition for a finding of incapac-
ity. It is unlikely to be sufficient because in addition the
loss of the ability to deliberate is likely to need to result
from some psychological or neurological impairment or
disturbance. Indeed, the MCA two-stage functional test
of capacity outlines such a requirement. According to that
test, a person lacks mental capacity only if (1) that person
suffers from an impairment or disturbance in the function-
ing of the mind or brain and (2) the impairment or distur-
bance in the mind or brain is such that the person is
incapable of making a decision. The idea might then be
that even if impulsive people within the healthy popula-
tion lack the ability to deliberate or use and weigh infor-
mation, they do not lack decisional capacity, because their
lack of ability is not due to an impairment in the function-
ing of the mind or brain.
The idea is an attractive one. It is tempting to think
impulsive people with moderate-to-severe TBI might lack
capacity because their inability to deliberate is due to some
psychological or neurological impairment. However, the
idea is not without its difficulties. To begin with, notice
the justification for distinguishing between the TBI case
and the non-TBI case requires us to be able to draw a clear
distinction between the inability to deliberate and the im-
pairment or disturbance in the mind or brain that is sup-
posed to be the cause of the inability. Only then do we have
a way of distinguishing between impulsive people with
brain injury and impulsive people without brain injury.
But it is unclear as to whether the inability and the mental
or neurological impairment that is supposed to be the cause
of the inability can be clearly distinguished, since it might
be reasonably supported that the impairment in mind or
brain from which a person is suffering just consists in the
person’s inability to deliberate.
Moreover, even supposing we can draw such a distinction,
we will need to be able to show that only in the TBI case is the
inability to deliberate due to an impairment in the mind or
brain. However, we need to take seriously the possibility that
impulsive people with brain injury and impulsive people with-
out brain injury have very similar psychological and neuro-
logical mechanisms underlying their inability to deliberate.
And if that turns out to be the case, then, again, we appear to
lack a principled way of distinguishing between impulsive
people with TBI and impulsive people within the healthy
population.
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Neither way of seeking to draw a distinction between
TBI impulsivity and impulsivity within the healthy popu-
lation is without its problems. The first way dubiously
assigns certain decisional abilities to impulsive people
within the healthy population. Even if some people within
the healthy population who behave impulsively on occa-
sion have such abilities, it is doubtful if this is true of
many impulsive people within the healthy population.
The second way of drawing a distinction arguably fails
to show that impulsive people in the healthy population
have capacity, since it remains unclear as to how to justify
attributing an impairment in the mind or brain to impul-
sive people with TBI but not to those without.
To conclude, it is worth spelling out a couple of rea-
sons why the overlap challenge is a significant problem
for the law. First, putting aside the question of whether
in practice most capacity assessors are likely to interpret
the law in a way that would lead them to find incompe-
tent many impulsive people within the healthy popula-
tion, the idea the law might imply that such people are
incompetent is a very worrisome one. Good law needs to
protect people from potential misuses of power. This re-
quires the law to be clear and precise regarding the cir-
cumstances in which capacity assessors can find a person
decisionally incompetent and potentially remove deci-
sional authority from them.6
Second, note the overlap challenge also throws into ques-
tion the legitimacy of a law that permits removal of decisional
authority from impulsive people with moderate-to-severe
TBI. This is because if we lack a principled way of
distinguishing between impulsive people with moderate-to-
severe TBI and impulsive people in the healthy population
that justifies finding only the former as being incompetent,
and we are of the view that the law should consider impulsive
people in the healthy population to have capacity, then we will
be very hard-pressed to explain what could justify the law
removing decisional authority from people with moderate-
to-severe TBI. In other words, if the law should consider im-
pulsive people in the healthy population to have capacity (as
the law surely should), then the law risks being arbitrary and
discriminatory if it does not say or imply the same in relation
to people with moderate-to-severe TBI.
The Valuing Spontaneity Challenge
The overlap challenge calls on the law to explain why it does
not entail that impulsive people in the healthy population are
incompetent. If successful, the overlap challenge should give
us serious pause for reflection. The valuing spontaneity
challenge builds on the overlap challenge by way of giving
positive reasons for thinking that impulsivity is not the kind of
thing that should disqualify someone from being allowed to
make decisions regarding significant aspects of their lives for
themselves.
Recall that the law has been anxious to avoid an outcome
test for capacity, opting instead for a process test. Recall also
that a primary justification for this is to allow people to be able
to make decisions in a way that accords with their own values
and preferences. To the extent that people are able to deliber-
ate regarding what to do or decide, the outcome of that process
of deliberation should be respected regardless of whether the
outcome is a good one or not. But why should the requirement
to respect a person’s decision-making apply only to the out-
come of the decisional process and not the decisional process
itself? What if someone does not care about deliberating or
using and weighing information, for instance? Indeed, this
seems to describe people who are impulsive, people who val-
ue or care about making decisions instinctively or spontane-
ously without thinking through the consequences of those
decisions.
The valuing spontaneity challenge, then, challenges the
law to give an account of why it assigns to reasoning or de-
liberation such a lofty status. Without giving such an account,
it is difficult to avoid the worry that the legal notion of capac-
ity unjustifiably displays a strong ‘rationalist’ bias, one that
favours a personality type associated with those who live their
lives in ways that are careful, considerate and reflective, but
not those who live their lives in ways that are carefree and
spontaneous.
Now, one way of responding to the valuing spontaneity
challenge is to point out that the law does allow people to be
impulsive if they have the ability to deliberate or use and
weigh information. But as we saw when discussing the over-
lap challenge, it is not clear whether impulsive people at large
do have the abilities in question. Moreover, even supposing
that impulsive people do possess the abilities on occasion, it is
unclear whether this response answers the valuing spontaneity
challenge. For that challenge is about respecting people’s right
to behave in a spontaneous or impulsive way, and that chal-
lenge seems to hold regardless of whether a person is able to
act in ways that are not impulsive. Imagine two people who
are impulsive in equal measure. Suppose that one person has
the ability to behave in a more measured way, whereas the
other person does not. It is difficult to see why this difference
between the two is relevant to whether one or both should
retain decisional authority. We are supposing that both people
6 That capacity assessors normally consider such things as normative data and
analysis of significant change when assessing capacity might be taken to
support the idea that there is near-negligible risk of impulsive people within
the healthy population being found incompetent. However, even if the risk of
such people being found incompetent is small, we should have real concerns
regarding a law that implies that such people are without capacity. Again, the
law exists to protect people from unwarranted intrusion into their lives, includ-
ing by those whose role it is to assess capacity. Claiming it does not matter
much whether the law entails that people within the healthy population are
incompetent because we can rely on the good judgement of mental capacity
assessors, is a little like saying we do not need child-safeguarding laws because
we can rely on those whose role it is to protect children to behave always in
their best interests.
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are engaging in identical behaviours and are engaging in those
behaviours for the same reasons, namely reasons that relate to
their impulsivity. Insofar as decisional outcome and decisional
process are concerned, there is no difference between the two
cases. So, what could justify insisting that one of these people
should be allowed to retain decisional authority but not the
other?
Another response to the valuing spontaneity challenge
might be to question whether impulsive people do value be-
having impulsively. Owen and colleagues observe that some
of the people with acquired brain injury they interviewed ap-
peared to express regret for the decisions they made (2018b:
31). We might take such findings to support the idea that these
people’s impulsive decision-making did not truly reflect their
values. But the issue of what a person really or truly values or
wants is a vexed one. Should we take a person’s professed
values (either at the time of behaving a certain way or later) to
be an accurate indication of what that person’s really values?
Or is a person’s actual behaviour a better indication of what
the person truly values? In this regard, note how we would
likely doubt someone who claims not to value acting impul-
sively but who all the same persistently behaves in an impul-
sive way.
Conclusion: Does the Law Need to Change?
The case of TBI with personality change raises a number of
challenges to mental capacity law, and especially the law’s
insistence that decisional capacity requires the ability to delib-
erate or use and weigh information. The first challenge asks
why the law does not imply that impulsive people within the
healthy population lack capacity, since arguably, many of
these people lack the ability to deliberate. The second chal-
lenge asks whether by requiring people to be able to deliberate
or weigh and use information the law wrongly violates the
sovereignty rights of people who are impulsive or spontane-
ous by nature.
Is a change in law needed? We have here a number of
considerations that speak in favour of a change in the law.
However, any change in the law would need to satisfy a num-
ber of requirements (Whiting, 2015; see also Appelbaum
1998, Berg et al. 1996, Coggon and Miola 2011).7 These
include requirements of proportionality (the change needs to
bring about more benefit than harm), effectiveness (the change
needs to lead to a desired outcome), necessity (there should be
no better alternative ways of achieving the outcome), equity
(the change should not lead to some people being more
favourably treated than others) and minimal infringement
(the change must interfere minimally with people’s liberties).
Now, one might support that a law that no longer demands
people to have the ability to deliberate would threaten a pro-
portionality requirement. For instance, people with moderate-
to-severe TBImake up a vulnerable group, and for that reason,
we might feel they need protecting from their decision-mak-
ing, even if this means they would be prevented from behav-
ing in ways they value or desire. We might also point out that
even if people with moderate-to-severe TBI lack capacity ac-
cording to existing law, decisions will still need to be made in
their best interests. This may often require surrogate decision-
makers to make decisions that respect what a person lacking
capacity desires, since people’s desires and preferences are
relevant to an assessment of people’s best interests. We might,
then, take the view that the risks attached to the legal status
quo are perhaps not all that great, at least when compared with
the risks that are attached to a change in the law.
Yet against the above reasons for retaining the legal status
quo, we might take the view instead that the harm the law
causes by removing decisional authority from those who are
impulsive is no lesser a harm than the harm the law would
cause were it to remove decisional authority from those who
are more rational or reflective by nature. We might also retain
significant worries regarding the inequity of a law that allows
impulsive people within the healthy population to have deci-
sional authority but not those with moderate-to-severe TBI.
And we might consider as well whether there are other ways
of supporting impulsive people with and without TBI that
does not require stripping them of their decisional authority.
The paper began by claiming that we should remain open
to the possibility that despite lawmakers’ best efforts, the law
has it wrong. Again, it is unclear as to whether reflection on
cases of personality change concomitant with TBI gives us
sufficient reason for thinking the law needs changing, but it
encourages us to take seriously the question of whether the bar
for capacity has been set at an appropriate level.
Thoughts and practice recommendations for mental capacity
assessors:
& This paper is a critique of English and Welsh law. If the
critique is successful, then that constitutes a strong case for
thinking that lawmakers might need to review and revise
mental capacity law.
& The paper does not seek to recommend changes in how
capacity assessors assess capacity, however. Mental ca-
pacity assessors need to work within the law, regardless
of whether a change in the law (for instance, a change to
the legal criteria for capacity) is warranted or not.
& Nevertheless, the views of capacity assessors (along with
other stakeholders) are important to the discussion of
whether the law should change. Again, this paper
7 The requirements listed are familiar from other contexts (for instance,
Childress et al. 2002 outline several such requirements with respect to the
evaluation of public health interventions; see also Brown and Whiting 2014,
who draw on such requirements for the purpose of evaluating distressing
health promotion advertising).
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advances reasons for thinking that impulsivity (or a corre-
sponding lack of ability to deliberate or use and weigh
information) should not constitute grounds for finding
someone incompetent. Assessors might reflect on whether
they agree.
& With regard to personality change concomitant with TBI,
a distinction is drawn between cases where capacity is
retained under existing law and cases where capacity is
lost under existing law. Mental capacity assessors need to
ensure they are able to distinguish between such cases and
do not automatically assume that someone who has under-
gone a personality change due to a moderate-to-severe
TBI lacks capacity solely because they might be more
susceptible to making unwise decisions.
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